26.68 Billion Yen Disappeared—What Hiroshima’s Special Fraud Asks Us

In 2023, the amount of damage caused by special fraud in Hiroshima Prefecture reached approximately 2.668 billion yen, marking the worst pace on record.

2.668 billion yen—let’s look at that number from a different angle. The median annual sales of small and medium-sized enterprises in Hiroshima Prefecture is around 100 million yen. This means that the annual revenue of 26 companies has been completely siphoned off by fraud. It’s not just the money that has disappeared. “I believed the voice on the other end of the phone” and “I didn’t doubt the name displayed on the screen”—this everyday trust is being eroded with each incident.

The increase in social media-based investment scams and romance scams is particularly notable. While traditional “Ore Ore” scams used a one-on-one connection via phone, social media scams leverage the credibility of platforms to approach victims. Photos of celebrities, plausible screenshots of investment achievements, and polite language create a structure where victims feel that “it was their fault for being deceived.”

This article will explore the situation in Hiroshima Prefecture from both sides: those who destroy trust and those who protect it.

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Trust Broken by Those Who Are Supposed to Protect It—Leak of Victim Information by Police Employees

The collapse of trust does not only occur from the criminal side.

A police officer in the Hiroshima Prefectural Police has been disciplined for a case in which documents related to an investigation containing the names of victims were leaked to the defendants. While the detailed circumstances remain unclear, the reported facts alone convey the gravity of the situation.

For crime victims, the fear of having their names known to the perpetrators is beyond imagination. If they are victims of special fraud, they have already experienced being “betrayed by someone they trusted.” The police, who are supposed to protect them, leaked their information. This can be described as a double betrayal.

The question here is whether this is an individual oversight or a flaw in the system. If it can be dismissed as the negligence of one officer, then the measures to prevent recurrence will end with mere “warnings.” However, unless we examine where the gaps were in the document management flow, access rights design, and checking system, the same issue will recur.

The Hiroshima Prefectural Police have expressed their commitment to thorough information management and strengthening employee education. However, mere words like “thorough” and “strengthen” do not clarify what will change. It is essential to demonstrate the changes in specific processes and who will check them—this is the minimum requirement for restoring trust.

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Six Minutes at the Counter—Hiroshima Bank Iwakuni Branch Stops 30 Million Yen

Not all stories are about breakdowns.

At the Hiroshima Bank Iwakuni Branch in Iwakuni City, a 30 million yen transfer scam was thwarted before it could occur. This is known as the “Fake President Scam”—where the scammer impersonates the president of a business partner and instructs an urgent fund transfer.

According to reports, when a counter employee received the transfer request, they noticed the large amount and the suspicious destination. They kindly confirmed the situation with the customer and encouraged them to contact the actual business partner. As a result, it was revealed to be a scam, and 30 million yen was saved.

It would be a waste to end this incident by simply crediting it to the employee’s merit. What deserves attention is the system that enabled that judgment.

In recent years, financial institutions have established manuals for verbal prompts during high-value transfers, criteria for identifying suspicious transactions, and immediate coordination flows with the police. According to statistics from the National Bank Association, in 2023, approximately 18,000 cases of special fraud were prevented at financial institution counters nationwide, amounting to about 27 billion yen. The average amount per case is about 15 million yen. The 30 million yen at the Hiroshima Bank Iwakuni Branch is double that amount.

However, it is not just the system that stops fraud. Even with a manual, it takes a certain courage to say to a customer, “Please wait a moment.” Stopping an impatient customer and asking, “Are you sure about this transfer?”—that brief moment of judgment was when the system and human effort aligned.

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Gaps in the System and Hands on the Ground—The Structure of ‘Trust Infrastructure’

The police leak and the banker’s prevention may seem like contrasting events, but they both contain the same question.

—Is trust protected by systems or by people?

The answer is “both.” However, the issue lies in how we weigh each.

The police case is an example of a gap in the system being exploited by a person. Even if there is a document management system, it will not function if the person operating it does not understand its significance. On the other hand, the bank case is an example of a system supporting human judgment. Because there was a manual, the employee was able to be confident that “my instincts are correct.”

In other words, systems and people are interdependent. Systems drive people, and people give life to systems. If either one is lacking, the infrastructure of trust will not function.

The figure of 2.668 billion yen in damage from special fraud is also the total amount resulting from a breakdown somewhere in this interdependent structure. There were no people around the elderly individuals receiving the calls to speak up. Those who saw the fraudulent ads on social media did not know where to seek advice. Even if systems exist, they did not reach those in need—this absence of “connections” is what generates damage with each incident.

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Creating a System that Reaches—Who Does This Make Comfortable?

Hiroshima Prefecture is planning to strengthen awareness activities and expand consultation services as part of its measures against special fraud in the 2024 fiscal year. The collaboration of police, financial institutions, local governments, and community watch networks has been repeated in words many times.

However, what is necessary to ensure that the word “collaboration” does not become empty is the design of specific touchpoints. For example, a system where when a financial institution detects a suspicious transaction, both the police and the customer’s family are contacted simultaneously. For instance, a local dedicated contact point where residents can report fraudulent ads on social media. Systems only move when it is clearly defined “who does what and when.”

And one more thing. Changing the structure where victims feel “ashamed for being deceived” and cannot seek advice. If the reporting rate of damages does not increase, the reality remains hidden, and measures will miss their mark. Creating an atmosphere where victims are not blamed is the most understated yet crucial part of awareness activities.

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Future Points of Interest

The situation surrounding special fraud in Hiroshima Prefecture is moving on three layers.

First, the trend of numbers. Will the damage amount in 2024 exceed or fall below the 2.668 billion yen of 2023? In particular, the increase or decrease of social media-based scams will serve as an indicator to measure the effectiveness of countermeasures.

Second, improvements in the police system. How will the review of information management following the leak incident manifest as specific system changes? It is necessary to follow the content of the “recurrence prevention measures.”

Third, the reality of on-site collaboration. How are the information and judgment of financial institutions, police, local governments, and community residents actually connected? This needs to be verified not on a system diagram but within the actual flow of operations.

The infrastructure of trust can break in an instant, but it takes time to build. Nevertheless, the fact that there was a bank employee who said, “Please wait a moment” at the counter—this fact serves as a small yet certain piece of evidence that trust can be preserved when systems and people align.