Ono’s Bid Rigging Scandal: Mayor’s Pay Cut Rejected as ‘Too Lenient’—When the Backbone of Water Supply Breaks

Turning on the tap brings forth water. What supports this seemingly ordinary act is a lengthy and unglamorous series of processes: laying pipes, conducting inspections, selecting contractors through bidding, and ensuring the quality of construction. The bid rigging scandal that emerged in Ono City has infiltrated these processes and undermined the very system itself. A former senior official (70) and a civil engineering company president (72) were found guilty, with the Hiroshima District Court declaring that they “damaged the trust in the system and exhibited low normative awareness.” Furthermore, the mayor’s proposal to reduce his own salary was rejected by the city council, which deemed the cut “too lenient.” With the punishment hanging in limbo, the trust in the system supporting the water supply quietly erodes.

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What Broke Was Not the Pipes, but the ‘Selection System’

Bid rigging refers to the act of officials on the ordering side leaking bid information to specific contractors and pre-determining the winning bidder. In this case, it is alleged that a former senior official in Ono City provided the civil engineering company president with information about design costs and bidding participants in advance.

Here, it is worth pausing to consider the true nature of what has been broken. It was not the water pipes that burst. The water purification plant did not stop functioning. What has been broken is the system that determines “who will be entrusted with the construction”—the very system of competitive bidding.

The public works bidding system is designed to ensure both the proper use of taxpayer money and the quality of construction by allowing multiple contractors to compete on price and technology, with the best contractor being selected. According to materials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the winning bid rate in competitive bidding, which is the ratio of the winning bid amount to the estimated price, typically falls within the range of 80-90% when healthy competition is at play. When bid rigging occurs, this winning bid rate tends to exceed 95%, sticking closely to the estimated price. In other words, a few percentage points that should have been saved—amounting to hundreds of thousands or even millions of yen—flow to specific contractors without competition.

The Ono City water supply business accounts for approximately 3 billion yen in revenue for the fiscal year 2023. If the fairness of bidding collapses in a municipality of this scale, the impact extends beyond a single construction project. When the atmosphere of “that company is the one that will win” spreads throughout the bidding process, other contractors lose their motivation to compete, ultimately draining the vitality of the local civil engineering industry itself.

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‘Too Lenient’—What the Rejection Revealed

In response to the scandal, Mayor Yuhiro Hiratani submitted a proposal to reduce his salary by 10% for three months to the city council. However, this proposal was rejected in the December 2024 city council meeting. The rationale provided by opposing council members was clear: “This level of reduction does not match the severity of the incident.”

There are two layers to this issue.

One is the problem of the “market perception” of punishment. In a case where officials were arrested and indicted for violating the bid rigging prevention law, and a guilty verdict was reached, a voluntary salary reduction of 10% for three months by the mayor falls into the lighter category compared to precedents in other municipalities. In the past, there have been instances where vice mayors resigned or mayors themselves proposed a 50% salary cut in similar cases. While the size of the numbers is not the only issue, when the attitude of “this will suffice as a conclusion” becomes apparent, the council’s call for a halt was—though somewhat unexpected—a reasonable response.

The second layer is the fact that nothing has happened since the rejection. With the salary reduction proposal rejected, there are currently no specific sanctions against the mayor. There have been no announcements of resignation, re-proposing a heavier salary cut, or establishing a third-party committee. The rejection was a judgment of “too lenient,” not a judgment of “to be overlooked,” but as a result, the void of punishment continues. The corrective measures that should have been implemented in response to the incident that broke the system have come to a halt. This void is perhaps the most unsettling state for the residents.

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Water Supply, Sea, Bidding—The Three-Layered Structure of Support

When discussing the water supply in Ono, there is a structural aspect that is often overlooked. This city faces the Seto Inland Sea and has a complex water supply system that includes supplying water to the islands. Maintaining underwater water supply pipes, managing distribution reservoirs on remote islands, and implementing measures against salt damage—all require unique costs and technologies that differ from those of mainland water supplies.

Additionally, the Ono Coast Guard collaborates with local governments and fishing cooperatives to conduct illegal dumping surveillance patrols (known as “Sea Patrols”). The preservation of the marine environment directly impacts the water quality of the intake source, making it relevant to the water supply business. The systems that protect the sea, the systems that protect the pipes, and the systems that select contractors—only when these three layers mesh together can the safety beyond the tap be ensured.

The bid rigging that has broken the third layer, the “system for selecting contractors,” can also have repercussions on the first and second layers. If a contractor lacking appropriate technology undertakes the construction, risks such as poor connections in underwater water supply pipes or inadequate salt damage treatment for distribution reservoirs may arise. These issues may manifest years later as “unknown leaks” or “abnormal water quality” before the residents. The consequences of infrastructure misconduct are often delayed. This is why maintaining fairness at the entry point—the bidding stage—holds such significance.

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After the System is Broken, Who Will Fix It?

Commonly cited measures for preventing recurrence include strengthening bidding oversight committees, implementing electronic bidding thoroughly, and establishing internal reporting systems. Ono City will likely be required to seek such institutional remedies in the future.

However, merely establishing systems is not enough. What has been highlighted by this incident is the structural issue of the same individuals sitting on both the ordering and receiving sides for many years. The former senior official, aged 70, and the civil engineering company president, aged 72—when and how did their relationship form? There is a depth of time that cannot be seen from court records alone. In local public works, there are likely moments when the boundary between human relationships and systems becomes blurred in every municipality. The Ono incident was a case where that boundary completely disappeared.

The city council’s rejection of the salary reduction proposal was at least a declaration of intent not to let it end as a mere formal punishment. However, if this declaration is not followed by a concrete redesign of the system, the rejection will also end up being merely formal.

In the future, three points should be closely monitored:

First, how the mayor will demonstrate accountability. Whether through re-proposing, resigning, or establishing a third-party committee—the choice made will reflect the self-purification capability of this city.

Second, whether concrete reforms to the bidding system will be implemented. Building a bidding oversight system that includes external members, verifying past bidding data, and publicly analyzing winning bid rates—the list of necessary actions is long, but each task is unglamorous. The question is whether the community can endure that unglamorous work.

Third, the relationship between residents and the council. This time, the council raised its voice, stating it was “too lenient.” Whether this judgment reflects the voices of the residents or is a result of political maneuvering is crucial. How residents perceive this issue and how long they continue to care about it will ultimately influence the reconstruction of the system.

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The Backbone Quietly Asks

The water supply business is least noticed when it is functioning smoothly. Turning on the tap brings forth water. How much planning, judgment, and manpower are expended to maintain that “ordinary”—it is usually invisible and doesn’t need to be seen. That is the nature of the support system.

However, when that support system is broken from within, who notices it, who raises their voice, and who will fix it? The Ono incident contains questions that extend beyond the scandal of a single local city. As municipal water supplies across the country face labor shortages and aging infrastructure, the fairness of bidding, the inheritance of technology, and the systems of oversight—if any one of these is lacking, the safety beyond the tap will quietly deteriorate.

The phrase “low normative awareness” written in the judgment by the Hiroshima District Court was directed at the individual defendants. However, that phrase gradually rebounds not only to the organization that neglected the system, the politics that fail to fill the void of punishment, but also to us who did not pay attention.

The water from the tap is still flowing. However, the trust in the system that supports it takes a very long time to restore once it has been lost—just like a leak in a water pipe.