Emphasis on Dialogue and Cooperation: ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
In June 2019, the 34th ASEAN Summit adopted the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) as the regional group’s vision for the Indo-Pacific. It was Indonesia, in the middle of the Indo-Pacific, that promoted the Outlook. AOIP envisions ASEAN centrality as the underlying principle and focuses on dialogue and cooperation.
It is also emphasized that AOIP is not aimed at creating a new mechanism, but will be implemented through existing ASEAN-led mechanisms. The existing mechanisms include China, and being “inclusive” is a key feature, without excluding geographically proximate China, which has close economic ties and powerful influence.
The four areas for AOIP cooperation are maritime, connectivity, United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and other issues. Since it is still not clear how the AOIP issues will be materialized, there are no explanations on action plans and funds for the cooperation. To realize the AOIP, support from ASEAN member countries and cooperation by the dialogue partners outside the region are essential.
Ⅰ. What Is ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)?
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) on June 23, 2019, at the 34th Summit. The AOIP comprises six parts: (1) background and rationale, (2) basic perspective, (3) objectives, (4) principles, (5) areas of cooperation, and (6) mechanism. We will start with the AOIP’s overview.*1
１. AOIP’s Background and Rationale
Southeast Asia is at the center of the Indo-Pacific region, the heart of today’s most dynamic economic growth in the world. Building an ASEAN-led regional architecture for economy and security would benefit its interests. ASEAN needs to take initiative in formulating a new vision for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
The AOIP is not aimed at creating new mechanisms or replacing existing ones; rather, it is intended to give new momentum for existing ASEAN-led mechanisms. The AOIP envisages ASEAN centrality as the underlying principle, with the East Asia Summit (EAS) and others as the platform for dialogue and cooperation.
２. The AOIP’s Basic Perspective
The basic perspectives of the AOIP are:
(1) Viewing the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions not as contiguous territorial spaces but as a closely integrated and interconnected region, with ASEAN playing a central and strategic role;
(2) An Indo-Pacific region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry
(3) An Indo-Pacific region of development and prosperity for all
(4) Development of the maritime domain and regional architecture.
The four objectives of the AOIP are:
(1) Offering an outlook to guide cooperation in the region
(2) Promote an enabling environment for peace, stability and prosperity in the region by addressing common challenges, upholding the rules-based regional architecture, promoting economic cooperation, and strengthening confidence and trust
(3) Enhancing ASEAN’s community-building process and further strengthening the existing ASEAN-led mechanisms
(4) Implementing ASEAN priority areas of cooperation, including maritime cooperation, connectivity, and SDGs.
AOIP is based on the principles of ASEAN centrality, openness, transparency, inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, complementarity with existing cooperation frameworks, equality, mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit and respect for international law, such as the UN Charter, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the ASEAN Charter and various ASEAN treaties and agreements, and the EAS Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations (2011).
Recognizing the contributions of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in sustaining peace and stability in the region for over 40 years, the AOIP would be guided by the purposes and principles in the TAC, which encompass peaceful settlement of disputes, renunciation of threat or use of force, and promotion of rule of law.
５. The Four Areas of Cooperation
The areas of cooperation for the AOIP include maritime cooperation, connectivity, SDGs, and other areas. In the maritime area, under universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, cooperation includes security, resource management, marine pollution countermeasures, and marine environment protection. For connectivity, ASEAN will aim to connect the connectivities by complementing and supporting the existing Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025.
Achieving the SDGs through the AOIP in the Indo-Pacific will contribute to the global community. In the other areas, cooperation will focus on ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025 targets.
Table 1. AOIP’s Four Areas of Cooperation
(1) Peaceful settlement of disputes, maritime safety and security, freedom of navigation and overflight, addressing transnational crimes
(2) Sustainable management of marine resources, promote maritime connectivity, protect livelihood of coastal communities and support small-scale fishing communities, to develop blue economy and to promote maritime commerce
(3) Marine pollution, sea-level rise, marine debris, preservation and protection of the marine environment and biodiversity, promoting green shipping
(4) Research and development, sharing of experience and best practices, capacity-building, managing marine hazards
(1) Exploring the key priority area of cooperation to reinforce the MPAC
(2) Developing a regional public-private partnership (PPP) development agenda to mobilize resources for connectivity projects, including infrastructure
(3) Exploring potential synergies with sub-regional frameworks, such as IORA, BIMSTEC, BIMP-EAGA, and Mekong subregional cooperation frameworks
(4) Establishment of a Seamless ASEAN Sky
(5) People-to-people connectivity
(6) Addressing challenges of rapid urbanization through the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) initiative
(1) Achieving the SDGs through utilization of digital economy
(2) Complementing and aligning the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and the 2030 UN Agenda with the SDGs
(3) Cooperation with the ASEAN Center for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue
Other Cooperation Areas
(1) South-South Cooperation (including South-South Triangular Cooperation)
(2) Trade facilitation and logistics infrastructure and services
(3) Digital Economy and the facilitation of cross-border data flow
(4) Micro, small and medium enterprises
(5) Science, technology research and development, and smart infrastructure
(6) Climate change and disaster risk management
(7) Active aging and innovation
(8) Deepening economic integration by implementing the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 and other FTAs
(9) Cooperation to prepare for the Fourth Industrial Revolution
(10) Enable micro, small and medium enterprises’ participation in the regional and global value chains
(Source: based on the AOIP)
Strategic discussions on this matter and practical cooperative activities can be pursued at ASEAN-led mechanisms, including the EAS, ASEAN Plus One mechanisms, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Defense Ministers (ADMM)-Plus.
Ⅱ. Emphasis on ASEAN Centrality and Use of Existing Mechanisms
１. Outlook of Dialogue and Cooperation
The significance of the AOIP is that ASEAN presented its own outlook in the Indo-Pacific concept that had been led by power nations outside the region such as Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India. In East Asia, multilayered regional architectures centering on ASEAN, such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and EAS (ASEAN+8) have been formed, and the ASEAN centrality had been functioning.
Meanwhile, development of new regional orders became active from the late 2010s, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) by the U.S. and Japan, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) by Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India. Thus, despite ASEAN’s location at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region, the regional order’s vision had been proceeding without its involvement, led by power nations outside the region.
Since 2018, with the intensifying U.S.-China conflict, the U.S. has positioned the Indo-Pacific as its stage to counter China. Under these circumstances, it was essential to present the AOIP to protect ASEAN’s position and interests, such as ASEAN centrality for regional cooperation, security, and economic development in the Indo-Pacific. The AOIP has great significance as an initiative for dialogue and cooperation based on ASEAN norms and 40 years of history in generating regional stability and peace.
２. Features of the AOIP
(1) Maintaining ASEAN Centrality
The basic principle of the AOIP is ASEAN centrality. ASEAN centrality is stipulated in Article 1, Purposes, and Article 2, Principles in the ASEAN Charter signed in December 2007. Article 41, Conduct of External Relations, stipulates, “ASEAN shall be the primary driving force in regional arrangements that it initiates and maintains its centrality in regional cooperation and community building.”
So, ASEAN centrality means ASEAN plays the leading role in the Asian regional cooperation and economic collaborations it is involved in, and becomes the driving force, or “sits in the driver’s seat.”
ASEAN centrality has two meanings; formal centrality and substantive centrality.*2 In contrast to the formal centrality of organizing meetings such as ASEAN+3 and providing a conference venue, substantive centrality means taking the initiative for content, such as coordinating and deciding the details and direction of the cooperation.
ASEAN members are weaker in economic, political, and military terms than the powerful countries outside the region. By integrating the countries as ASEAN, ASEAN centrality aims to protect ASEAN’s interests and realize its claims by taking initiative in administrating meetings in the Asian region that it attends.
(2) No New Mechanisms
In the AOIP, it is stressed that the Indo-Pacific outlook will be discussed and conducted through the existing mechanisms, instead of creating new ones. The existing mechanisms are ASEAN-led frameworks, such as the EAS, ADMM-Plus, and ARF. The AOIP states that discussions and cooperation on the Indo-Pacific outlook will be conducted through ASEAN-led mechanisms.
Existing frameworks of ASEAN-led mechanisms are operated on the basic principles of ASEAN centrality. Therefore, proceeding the Indo-Pacific outlook with the existing framework means ASEAN centrality is doubly secured, by principle and by the framework for discussions and implementation. The existing mechanisms have a large implication for ensuring inclusiveness.
(3) Emphasis on Inclusiveness
Being inclusive is also an important principle of the AOIP. Inclusiveness means no country will be excluded. In the Indo-Pacific outlook, it means China will not be excluded. China is involved in ASEAN-led frameworks, so the AOIP that proceeds with the ASEAN-led frameworks does not exclude China. That the AOIP pursues an Indo-Pacific region with dialogue and cooperation, instead of competition, also means it does not exclude China.
Beijing had been cautious of Indo-Pacific frameworks, especially the Quad, as efforts to contain China. During the AOIP discussions, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi is reported to have promised Cambodia’s foreign minister that Indonesia does not intend to introduce new a regional architecture.*3 China’s inclusion in the framework to proceed the AOIP could mean that it reflects Beijing’s intentions.
(4) Focus on Economic and Social Cooperation
In the areas of cooperation, there were some commonalities with the Japan-U.S. cooperation for maritime cooperation, such as maritime safety and security, and freedom of navigation and overflight, but many were social development areas, including environmental issues, resource management, protection of small-scale fishing communities, and managing marine hazards. For connectivity, the AOIP focuses on complementing and supporting the MPAC 2025.
For SDGs and other areas, trade facilitation, logistics infrastructure and services, micro, small and medium enterprises, science, technology research and development, smart infrastructure, AEC Blueprint 2025 and other free trade agreements including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and cooperation on preparing for the Fourth Industrial Revolution—common areas with the AEC are listed.
The cooperation applies to the ASEAN and the ASEAN member countries. Unlike Japan’s FOIP, the cooperation does not apply to Africa or Pacific Island nations.
３. The AOIP and the Indo-Pacific Concept by Japan-U.S.-Australia-India
With the announcement of the AOIP, Indo-Pacific concepts by five countries/region including Japan, the U.S., Australia, India, and ASEAN exist concurrently.*4 Although they have many things in common, there are apparent differences in the names, applicable regions, principles, and areas of cooperation, and they seem to have differing intents (Table 2).
As for the names, both Japan and the U.S. call it “Free and open Indo-Pacific,” while Australia’s is “Stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific,” India’s is “Free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific,” and ASEAN’s is “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” As for the covering region, the Japanese and Indian versions stretch from the U.S. West Coast to Africa. The U.S. version spans from the U.S. West Coast to India’s west coast.
For Japan, as is symbolized by Prime Minister Abe’s proposal of the concept at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), the focus is on connecting Asia with Africa. For the principles, all five versions share the freedom of navigation, peaceful settlement of disputes, construction of quality infrastructure, free markets, and economic integration, but Australia, India, and ASEAN have added “inclusive.”
Especially, India’s “Free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific,” announced in June 2018 by Prime Minister Modi, stresses inclusiveness. India’s outlook can be characterized by: (1) inclusive concept including all countries in the region, (2) ASEAN centrality for the Indo-Pacific concept, (3) denial of taking one side of the divide, and (4) emphasis on connectivity. Many overlaps with the AOIP.
As for Japan, since the announcement from the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Consultations in June 2018 stated, “The four countries reaffirmed shared support for a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region,” both Japan and the U.S. seem to approve “inclusive” from 2018. Behind Japan’s acceptance of the “inclusive” concept lies improving Japan-China relations and infrastructure cooperation by Japan-China private sector in third countries.
In November 2018, the Japanese government changed the name of the concept to “Free and open Indo-Pacific vision” from “Free and open Indo-Pacific strategy.”
While the five versions have many things in common in the areas of cooperation, such as infrastructure cooperation, maritime cooperation, and economic integration, Japan focuses on (high-quality) infrastructure building and the U.S. is more inclined to the security side. ASEAN includes its social economic developments, such as AEC 2025. India focuses on maritime cooperation.
Japan has presented the most detailed and specific measures and projects, with large amounts of funds. The U.S. has also announced detailed projects and measures.*5 Economic integration is a common area of cooperation. As specific Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Japan has TPP11, the U.S. has U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement, India has (balanced) Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and ASEAN has RCEP.
Ⅲ. AOIP Adopted by Indonesia’s Initiative
Although ASEAN is located where the two oceans meet, its announcement of the Indo-Pacific concept was later than Japan (2016), the U.S. (2017), Australia (2017), and India (2018). ASEAN nations had agreed on the basic principles of the Indo-Pacific outlook, including ASEAN centrality, openness, transparency, inclusiveness, and a rule-based approach.*6 But reaching consensus took time because the member countries had different views on the Indo-Pacific concept.
In particular, since the FOIP by Japan and the U.S. was oriented towards containing China, it made many countries hesitate or be cautious. It is said that Indonesia showed the most enthusiasm. Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand did not dissent, while Malaysia, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Laos remained silent.*7
All the ASEAN nations have joined China’s BRI, and many link their own country’s development initiative with the BRI. ASEAN countries are all members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, too. Cambodia and Laos have especially shown great appetite in receiving Chinese investments and economic support. China is the largest trade partner of ASEAN, accounting for 14.6 percent of its exports and 22.3 percent of imports.
ASEAN and China have signed an FTA (ACFTA) that includes agreements for goods, services, and investments. ASEAN countries have high expectations for Chinese investment, including the BRI. According to a 2021 survey conducted on experts and opinion leaders in ASEAN by ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak Institute in Singapore, 76.3 percent of respondents considered China was the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia, while it was 7.4 percent for the U.S., and only 4.4 percent for Japan.*8
David Shambaugh, a prominent China expert, says that a China-shift is advancing among Thailand, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian countries in recent years, and pro-China countries are increasing*9 (Figure 1). It is extremely difficult for ASEAN countries to support the FOIP, which Beijing considers ”confining China.“ For the power nations outside the ASEAN region to promote the Indo-Pacific concept, it is critical to adopt the ASEAN perspective stated in the AOIP.
Indonesia was enthusiastic about the Indo-Pacific concept. Being the world’s largest archipelago nation consisting of approximately 17,000 islands and located between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the country considered managing and developing the marine regions was extremely important for its interests. Indonesia was early to announce its vision of the Indo-Pacific.
In July 2013, Yudhoyono administration’s Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa made a speech titled “An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific,”*10 and claimed that, instead of dividing the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, we should consider a new regional order of the Indo-Pacific, and proposed to work together towards an Indo-Pacific-wide treaty of friendship and cooperation.
Under the Joko Widodo administration, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi proposed the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. With the principles of “open, transparent, inclusive, dialogue, cooperation, and upholding international law,” the concept stresses ASEAN’s unity and centrality.*11 At the 8th EAS ministerial meeting in August 2018, Retno presented the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept, and guaranteed ASEAN will not create a new mechanism but cooperate through the existing ones.
Although other ASEAN countries showed muted response to this concept, the Indonesian government boosted its diplomatic efforts from 2019. At the January ASEAN foreign minister’s meeting, it requested to have the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept adopted but failed to reach agreement.
In March, it held a High-Level Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific in Jakarta, attended by foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers from 18 ASEAN and dialogue partner countries. It also held the Indonesia South Pacific Forum in which 15 countries attended. And at the June ASEAN Summit, Indonesia submitted the AOIP, and it was finally adopted.
Ⅳ. The AOIP’s Challenge: How to Materialize
The AOIP’s biggest challenge is how to materialize it to attain the goals. It is a guiding principle and not a legally binding document or a treaty. The four areas of cooperation list many fields, but there is no mention of how they will be implemented to achieve the goals, and action plans must be made for conducting the AOIP. In the previously mentioned survey on experts in ASEAN, 40.3 percent, the highest ratio of respondents, think that “the AOIP needs to be explained more clearly” (Table 3).*12
In the connectivity area, funds and concrete plans are not mentioned. Many fields overlap with ASEAN 2025, especially the cooperation areas for structuring AEC 2025, and the action plans for AEC 2025 will probably be implemented with the cooperation from the dialogue partners.
The second challenge is how to realize the AOIP purpose through existing mechanisms. Existing mechanisms, such as the EAS, include China. Enhancing maritime cooperation with China involved, or dialogues including both the U.S. and China, could be possible. However, with U.S.-China conflict in maritime security, effectiveness in maritime security and other areas may be difficult.
The major dialogue partners other than China have welcomed the AOIP. As for the U.S., the U.S. Mission for ASEAN announced on July 2, 2020 that it welcomes the AOIP. Considering that the AOIP concept converges with the U.S.’s FOIP vision and the regional approach of its allies and partners, the U.S. stated that it sees ASEAN centrality as the core of the Indo-Pacific strategy and expects to have discussions with ASEAN. At the August 2021 U.S.-ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting, the U.S. announced a cooperation program for the AOIP.
To show Japan’s high appreciation and support for the AOIP, at the 34th EAS in November 2020, Prime Minister Abe stated Japan would give full support for the AOIP, realize synergies with the FOIP, and cooperate to materialize the AOIP. The cooperation has already begun.*13 South Korea, Australia, and India have also expressed support for the AOIP at the G20 Summit in June 2020.
China, which criticized the FOIP as an Indo-Pacific version of NATO that will destabilize the region, and will “dissipate like sea foam,” showed an understanding of the AOIP.
At the July 31, 2019 press conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that many of the principles and views in the AOIP, such as an open, inclusive, transparent ASEAN, dialogue instead of conflict, emphasis on economic cooperation, strengthening of connectivity, and achieving prosperity for all, are consistent with China’s expectations, and China will maintain close communication and cooperation to create and keep up a sound environment towards regional cooperation.*14
To materialize the AOIP, the support and cooperation of the ASEAN member countries is a must. Indonesia has proposed and took initiative for ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific concept, and its role is critical to implement the AOIP. Another country actively working on the AOIP is Vietnam. While Indonesia emphasizes cooperation, Vietnam focuses on security, and is strengthening the bilateral relations with the Quad countries.*15
Enthusiasm in supporting the AOIP seems to differ widely among the ASEAN states. For ASEAN to maintain its centrality and play a leading role, solidarity among the member countries is essential. This is the same with AOIP, and the ASEAN countries must unite to support the AOIP.
Meanwhile, the AOIP was compiled by seeking common ground within the context of U.S.-China conflict, including pro-China countries like Cambodia. In promoting the AOIP, if the balance tips too far towards the U.S. or China, ASEAN may not be able to maintain its solidarity, and steering the process would be an extremely difficult task. The practical direction is to proceed with economic cooperation by maintaining ASEAN centrality and gaining support from the dialogue partners.
*1 ASEAN (2019), “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”
*2 Shoji, Tomotaka (2017), “ASEAN ‘Centrality’—from the Perspectives of Internal and External Relations” (in Japanese), “NIDS Security Studies,” 17 (1).
*3 Jakarta Globe, “Indonesian Presents Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept at ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,“ August 2, 2018
*4 Currently, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and EU have announced their Indo-Pacific concepts, and the U.K. is also expressing involvement with the region.
Watanabe, Hirotaka (2021) “How to View the Europe within the World—EU’s new ‘Global Strategy’” (in Japanese) JFIR World Review, Vol. 4, June 2021 pp. 12-19.
*5 Ishikawa, Koichi (2020) “The U.S.’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Read from the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act and Defense Department and State Department Reports on the Indo-Pacific” (in Japanese) World Economic Review Impact+, No. 16.
*6 Oba, Mie (2019) “The Diversity of the ‘Indo-Pacific’: Asian Perspective” ‘in Japanese), “Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific Region and Achieving the ‘Rule of Law’—A New Approach in Japanese Diplomacy to Maintain and Strengthen Global Public Goods,” The Japan Institute of International Affairs.
*7 Lee, John (2018), “The ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ and Implications for ASEAN,” Trends in Southeast Asia, 2018, No. 3, ISEAS, p. 27.
At the 34th Summit Meeting, Thailand supported Indonesia.
Macan-Markar Marwaan (2019), “Indonesia and Singapore feud over ASEAN engagement in Indo-Pacific” Nikkei Asia Weekly, July 19, 2019.
*8 Seah, S. et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2021,” ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak Institute, Singapore, February 16, 2021.
The survey was conducted by ISEAS in Singapore from November 18, 2020 to February 10, 2021 in 10 ASEAN countries, with 1,032 participants who were experts on ASEAN and the Asian region. Respondents consisted of five categories: Academia/research, business/finance, government, civil society/non-governmental, and media. The report states that, while it is not meant to represent the view of the ASEAN, the survey acts as a predominant view of the opinion leaders that influence regional policies on social and economic matters in ASEAN countries.
*9 Although the Philippines shifted towards China during the Duterte administration, it shifted towards the U.S. because of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and closer social-economic relations.
Shambaugh, David (2021) “Where Great Powers Meet—America & China in Southeast Asia,” Oxford University Press, p.243.
*10 Natalegawa, Marti (2013), “An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific,” Jakarta Post, May 20, 2013.
*11 Jansen am (2018), “What’s in Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept?” The Diplomat, May 16, 2018.
*12 Seah, S. et al., “The State of Southeast Asia: 2021,” ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak Institute, Singapore, February 16, 2021.
*13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020), “Japan-ASEAN Efforts on AOIP Cooperation (List)”
*14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Peoples Republic of China, July 31, 2019.
*15 Hoan Thi Ha (2021), “ASEAN Navigates between Indo-Pacific Polemics and Potentials,” Perspective, 2021 NO. 49, ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, pp.5-6.
For example, it held a summit with India in December 2020 and emphasized the importance of India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOP), and joined the Quad+3 meeting in April 2020.
Koichi, Ishikawa (2019) “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Concept,” Hitoshi, Hirakawa et al. “The Political Economy of the Belt and Road Initiative” (in Japanese), Bunshindo.
Oba, Mie (2019) “The Diversity of the ‘Indo-Pacific’: Asian Perspective,” “Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific Region and Achieving the ‘Rule of Law’—A New Approach in Japanese Diplomacy to Maintain and Strengthen Global Public Goods” (in Japanese), The Japan Institute of International Affairs.
Hoan Thi Ha (2021), “ASEAN Navigates between Indo-Pacific Polemics and Potentials,” Perspective, 2021 NO. 49, ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.
Lee, John (2018), “The ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ and Implications for ASEAN,” Trends in Southeast Asia, 2018, No. 3, ISEAS, p. 27
Shambaugh, David (2021) “Where Great Powers Meet—America & China in Southeast Asia,” Oxford University Press.
Research fellow at the Institute of Asian Studies at Asia University. Graduated from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Careers include Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Institute for International Trade and Investment (ITI), Institute of Asian Studies at Asia University Director and Professor. Director of ASEAN Study Group in Tokyo. Co-author of books including, “Asia’s Economic Integration and Protectionism” (in Japanese, from Bunshindo, 2019), “Asia Economy at Crossroads” (in Japanese, from Bunshindo, 2021).