Abandoning “Strategic Ambiguity”? A Prime Minister’s Answer That Shakes Postwar Japan’s Security Policy

On November 7, 2025, during a session of Japan’s House of Representatives Budget Committee, a remark was made that shook the very foundations of the country’s security policy. Newly installed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, in response to a question from a Constitutional Democratic Party lawmaker about how Japan would respond if China were to use force against Taiwan—a so-called “Taiwan contingency”—stated the following:

“If it involves the use of warships and the exercise of military force, then by any reasonable standard, I believe it could constitute a ‘survival-threatening situation.’”

This single sentence went far beyond the framework of an ordinary Diet reply. It may have opened a “Pandora’s box” that could dramatically alter the geopolitical balance in East Asia.

A “survival-threatening situation” is a concept newly defined in the security legislation package enacted in 2015. It refers to a situation in which an armed attack is launched against a country with close ties to Japan (primarily the United States), and as a result Japan’s own survival is threatened and there is a clear danger that the lives and rights of its people could be fundamentally overturned. Once the government officially recognizes such a situation, Japan may exercise the “right of collective self-defense” and use military force, even if Japan itself has not come under direct attack.

Successive Liberal Democratic Party administrations had maintained “strategic ambiguity” on whether a Taiwan contingency would qualify as such a situation, repeatedly saying that “it depends on the specific circumstances,” in order to avoid a definitive clash with China. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did once declare that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency,” but that was expressed as his personal view after leaving office. Never before in Japan’s constitutional history had a sitting prime minister, in an official Diet setting, explicitly linked the possibility of military intervention to the legal definition of a survival-threatening situation.

Takaichi’s remark is both an expression of her convictions as a security “hawk” and a leap beyond previous government interpretations. She did not limit herself to gray-zone scenarios such as a blockade of the Taiwan Strait or the laying of naval mines; she cited a concrete case of “China using warships to exercise military force” and declared that such a situation would affect Japan’s very survival.

This can be interpreted as an attempt to send a strong deterrent signal to China: “If you move on Taiwan, Japan will step in.” At the same time, it was the moment when the prime minister herself openly presented to the Japanese public the risk that Japan could be automatically drawn into a U.S.–China military conflict.

This shift—what might be called a move from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity”—forced officials at the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry into frantic damage control. Yet Prime Minister Takaichi has remained defiant, later stating that she has “no intention of retracting or correcting” her remark and insisting that her words are consistent with the government’s long-standing position.

Domestic Division and Confusion: Opposition Backlash and the Risk of Exposing Japan’s “Playbook”

Prime Minister Takaichi’s “far-reaching” statement immediately deepened political divisions at home. The main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party and the Japanese Communist Party have fiercely criticized the remark, calling it “a departure from the government’s explanation at the time of the security legislation” and “a unilateral move that heightens the risk of war.”

During the 2015 debates on the security legislation, the government repeatedly emphasized that the exercise of collective self-defense would be permitted only in “extremely limited” cases and sought to ease public concerns by stressing the narrow scope. Takaichi’s latest comment, however, effectively extends that “limited” framework to the Taiwan Strait—a region of maximum sensitivity both geographically and politically. Among opposition parties and liberals, this has quickly fueled fears that the principle of exclusive defense, rooted in Article 9 of the Constitution, is being eroded by stealth.

Even Yuichiro Tamaki, leader of the more conservative Democratic Party for the People, has taken a cautious stance toward Takaichi’s remark. On a television program, Tamaki said, “Openly discussing specific cases is essentially revealing our ‘playbook,’ so such comments should be kept to a minimum.”

In security strategy, clearly stating where the red line lies for the use of force can serve as deterrence, but it also allows adversaries to prepare countermeasures and risks robbing one’s own diplomacy of flexibility. Tamaki’s point reflects a broader sense of unease in Nagatacho: that Takaichi’s comment may have been driven more by ideological conviction than by strategic calculation, and that it lacked diplomatic subtlety.

The episode also exposes potential weaknesses in the Takaichi administration’s decision-making process. According to media reports, the prime minister held study sessions until as late as 3 a.m. in preparation for the Budget Committee. Her zeal, however, may have led to “going off on her own” without sufficient alignment with the bureaucracy.

On November 25, the government approved a Cabinet answer to a written question from an opposition lawmaker, stating that Takaichi’s remark was “not inconsistent with the government’s conventional view.” This response suggests that the Prime Minister’s Office felt compelled to formally endorse her statement, despite its discomfort.

Public opinion is deeply divided. Among those already wary of China, Takaichi’s stance is welcomed as “reassuring,” while in the business community and among moderates, it is seen as an “unnecessary provocation.” The remark has thus become a spark that risks splitting the nation.

China’s Fury and the Launch of “Economic Coercion”: A Heavy Price for Tourism and Trade

China’s response to Prime Minister Takaichi’s remark has been as fierce and coordinated as expected—if not more so. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning has repeatedly condemned the comment at daily press briefings, calling it “a grave provocation by the Japanese side” that “seriously undermines the political foundation of China–Japan relations,” and has demanded an immediate retraction.

Xue Jian, the Chinese Consul General in Osaka, took to X (formerly Twitter) with incendiary posts that even hinted at “pest” extermination, exposing a level of hostility that far exceeded normal diplomatic decorum. This signaled that Beijing no longer sees the Takaichi administration as a “partner for dialogue,” but as a target to be forced into submission through pressure.

China’s anger has not been confined to words. It has swiftly taken the form of concrete “sanctions” against Japan’s real economy. In mid-November, the Chinese government effectively issued a travel advisory urging its citizens to refrain from visiting Japan. In line with that move, major Chinese airlines such as Air China and China Eastern Airlines announced they would waive cancellation fees for flights to Japan. The result was an extraordinary situation in which some 500,000 Japan-bound tickets were canceled in just a matter of days.

This boycott is dealing a severe blow to Japan’s tourism industry. According to estimates by Nomura Research Institute economist Takahide Kiuchi, if this situation continues for a year, the decline in inbound consumption could result in an economic loss of about 2.2 trillion yen and push down Japan’s GDP by 0.36%. Department stores in Tokyo and Osaka and tourist destinations in Hokkaido are already crying out in pain, while shares of related companies have fallen across the board.

China also appears determined to maintain and even strengthen its ban on imports of Japanese seafood, meaning that the fallout from Takaichi’s remark is spreading all the way to the grassroots of regional economies. Some voices argue that a decline in “zero-dollar tourism”—where profits circulate only among Chinese-run businesses—might help relieve overtourism, but the macroeconomic losses far outweigh any such benefits.

Entrenched “Confrontation Without Dialogue”: Isolation at the G20 and Japan’s Future Course

The G20 summit held in South Africa from November 22 became a stage that symbolized the deterioration in Japan–China relations. Prime Minister Takaichi sought opportunities to engage with Chinese Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of the summit, but Beijing flatly rejected any contact.

During the summit, the two leaders did not even exchange pleasantries, let alone hold a brief corridor chat. Reports say they avoided eye contact altogether and kept their distance even during the group photo. The Chinese Foreign Ministry dismissed the prospect of a summit meeting by saying that “conditions are not in place,” thereby maintaining a policy of complete disregard toward Takaichi.

At her press conference after returning home, Takaichi insisted that “the door to dialogue is always open.” Yet her words rang hollow, because what Beijing demands is not dialogue but the “retraction” and “capitulation” of the prime minister’s remarks.

For Takaichi, however, retracting her statement would be political suicide, triggering an exodus of her conservative base. It is therefore not an option. As a result, Japan–China relations have fallen into a stalemate of “confrontation without dialogue,” with no exit in sight.

There is also growing concern about Japan’s standing in the international community. The United States has expressed its support through its ambassador, but President-elect Donald Trump boycotted the latest G20, leaving it unclear how deeply the U.S. will remain engaged as an ally. Furthermore, in a G20 increasingly shaped by the Global South, deepening confrontation with China could undermine Japan’s leadership role in the Asia–Pacific region.

The November 7 Diet remark may prove to have been a historic turning point, marking Japan’s decision to move toward becoming a country that is prepared to fight. But the economic and diplomatic costs of that resolve are only beginning to be paid.

The Takaichi administration now faces an unprecedentedly difficult task: steering Japan through the triple challenge of intense economic pressure from China, deepening domestic division, and an increasingly unstable international environment.

The winds howling across the straits around Japan in the winter of 2025 are more than just seasonal gales—they are a cold storm heralding the return of a new Cold War structure.