The Rise of the “Global South” and a Vacuum Left by U.S. Absence: Japan’s Cohesion Tested in Johannesburg

On the night of November 24, 2025, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi completed all her engagements at the G20 Leaders’ Summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, and returned to Tokyo’s Haneda Airport aboard the government aircraft. Held for the first time ever on the African continent, this G20 summit adopted “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability” as its overarching theme and became a historic turning point in which the so-called “Global South” of emerging and developing countries took center stage in international politics as never before. Yet behind the glitter of this grand diplomatic stage, a serious tectonic shift was unfolding that shook the very foundations of the existing framework for international cooperation.

What was particularly noteworthy was the highly unusual absence of the head of state of the world’s largest economy, the United States. President Donald Trump, back in power, chose to boycott the summit, citing strong opposition to the South African government’s policies and to the summit’s DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) agenda. He went so far as to declare that “South Africa is no longer fit to be in the G20,” casting doubt even on how far the United States will engage as next year’s chair. This “American vacuum” created a dangerous empty space that could deepen the divide between the G7 and the Global South.

In this difficult environment, Prime Minister Takaichi took on the role of filling that void by energetically pursuing bilateral diplomacy under the banner of “the rule of law” and “international cooperation.” During her stay, she held formal or informal talks with leaders from more than 20 countries and international organizations, including British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung. In particular, she confirmed cooperation with various partners on practical issues such as strengthening supply chains for “critical minerals,” a linchpin of economic security, developing international governance for the rapidly spreading use of AI, and reducing disaster risk—an agenda Japan has long championed—culminating in the adoption of joint statements. This can be seen as tangible evidence of Japan’s diplomatic skill.

However, there was a certain hollowness in Takaichi’s words at her press conference upon returning to Japan, when she stressed that “it is essential to seek common ground and points of agreement, rather than division and confrontation.” That is because between Japan and China—Japan’s largest neighbor and its biggest trading partner—there lay the hard reality of an almost complete “breakdown in dialogue.” Amid the heated atmosphere of Johannesburg, the fact that only the leaders of Japan and China remained locked in cold silence cast a dark shadow over Japan’s diplomatic achievements at this summit.

Frozen Japan–China Relations: The Taiwan Contingency Remarks and Premier Li Qiang’s Silence Signal a New Cold War Structure

At this G20 summit, the focal point that Japanese media and diplomats were watching most closely was whether a summit meeting between Prime Minister Takaichi and Chinese Premier Li Qiang would take place. In the end, there was not only no formal meeting, but not even a brief chat in the corridor or a short “pull-aside” encounter. A thick wall separated the two leaders, both physically and psychologically. Reports say that even at the time of the group photo at the summit venue, the two leaders deliberately kept their distance and did not so much as exchange glances.

This was not a matter of scheduling conflicts or diplomatic oversight; it was an elaborate and unmistakable signal from Beijing—a powerful message of “diplomatic neglect” directed at the current Japanese administration.

The immediate trigger for this decisive rift came on November 7, just before the summit, when Prime Minister Takaichi stated during a Diet Budget Committee session that a contingency in Taiwan could qualify as a “situation that threatens Japan’s survival” under Japan’s security-related legislation—marking the first time a sitting prime minister had clearly expressed such a view. Abandoning the “strategic ambiguity” that past Japanese governments had kept regarding involvement in Taiwan, she suggested that Japan might even consider exercising the right of collective self-defense in a Taiwan contingency. Beijing’s reaction was fierce.

During the summit, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning repeatedly condemned the comments, insisting that “the Japanese leader’s erroneous remarks on Taiwan have seriously undermined the political foundation of China–Japan relations,” and claiming that the entire responsibility for the lack of a meeting lay with Japan.

China views Takaichi’s remarks as a provocative act that crossed a “red line” that must not be breached. Starting with a barrage of criticism on social media by Xue Jian, the Chinese Consul General in Osaka, Beijing quickly escalated its response with formal diplomatic protests and, as discussed below, economic reprisals. Premier Li’s stubborn posture at the G20 clearly showed that Xi Jinping’s leadership no longer regards the Takaichi administration as a partner for “dialogue and consensus-building,” but as a target whose behavior must be changed through “pressure.”

At her post-summit press conference, Takaichi maintained a calm tone, saying, “Japan’s door to dialogue with China is always open. We have not shut the door.” At the same time, however, she also stated, “Japan will continue to assert what it must assert,” making it clear at home and abroad that she had no intention of retracting her comments.

Within the Japanese government, pessimistic assessments are spreading, with some saying that “it may take four or five years to improve the relationship.” Japan–China ties have now entered a “glacial period,” the coldest phase since diplomatic normalization in 1972. The previous pattern of “cold politics, hot economics”—where political friction coexisted with buoyant economic ties—is no longer sustainable. The confrontation is now at the front line of “economic security,” where security and economics are inextricably linked—a reality that became visible on the ground in Johannesburg.

The Myth and Reality of “Zero-Dollar Tourism” and the Shock to the Real Economy: 500,000 Cancellations and Growing Domestic Turmoil

The icy silence on the diplomatic stage has quickly spilled over into Japan’s real economy, where the impact is growing more serious by the day. In response to Takaichi’s remarks, the Chinese government effectively issued a travel advisory discouraging trips to Japan. As a result, the number of airline tickets and tour bookings slated through year-end that have been canceled is estimated at around 500,000.

Regions whose economies have heavily depended on Chinese tourist spending—such as Hokkaido and Kyoto—have been particularly hard hit. Ahead of the lucrative winter season, hotels, duty-free shops, and tour bus operators are finding themselves in a situation where they cannot see any clear outlook for revenues.

Some online commentators have welcomed the decline in visitors arriving on cheap package tours and circulating only among Chinese-owned businesses—so-called “zero-dollar tourism,” which leaves little money in the local economy. They argue that this could help ease overtourism and improve the quality of tourism. Indeed, in some areas such as Kyoto, there is a side benefit in the form of reduced congestion and improved quality of life for residents.

But when one looks at the economic reality, such optimism is precarious. In practice, footfall from individual travelers, including wealthy tourists (FITs), has also begun to decline. The loss of the substantial spending that such visitors would otherwise have generated could directly depress Japan’s GDP growth rate.

In 2024, inbound arrivals to Japan hit a record high, and inbound consumption grew to a scale comparable to that of export industries. In that context, a freeze in the Chinese market, Japan’s largest source of inbound tourists, poses a serious risk that could amount to “a lost one trillion yen” for regional economies.

Moreover, China is signaling that it will maintain and even tighten its import ban on Japanese seafood, suggesting that the impact is likely to be prolonged not only for tourism but also for agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.

Japan’s business community—particularly leaders in the Keidanren business federation—are acutely aware of the importance of economic security, yet they are also deeply concerned about the negative impact that deteriorating relations with Japan’s largest trading partner will have on corporate activity. Keidanren Chairman Masakazu Tokura has stressed that economic stability is essential if Japan is to maintain momentum for wage hikes and exit deflation, and he cannot hide his alarm over the prospect of diplomatic confrontation dragging down the economy.

The gap is widening between Takaichi’s stated policy of maintaining a “mutually beneficial strategic relationship” with China and the reality of increasing “economic coercion” by Beijing. As cries of distress rise from tourist regions, the government is being pressed to roll out new economic measures and to accelerate shifts toward alternative markets in Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America. But it will not be easy to fill the massive hole left by the Chinese market in a short time.

Caught between diplomatic principles and the harsh reality of struggling regional economies, the administration faces an extremely difficult course to steer.

2026 Beyond “Strategic Patience”: The G20 Under a Trump Administration and Japan’s Path

With the G20 summit now over, Japanese diplomacy is already turning its gaze toward 2026. Next year’s G20 chair will be the United States, with President Trump serving as host. Yet given that Trump boycotted the Johannesburg summit in protest against its diversity-focused agenda and has shown a dismissive attitude toward multilateral cooperation itself, it is completely unclear how he will behave as chair.

Trump has already declared that the next summit will be held at his own Doral golf resort in Florida, raising the likelihood that what is supposed to be a forum for international cooperation will instead become a stage for showcasing “America First.”

Amid this uncertainty, Prime Minister Takaichi has adopted what could be called a long-term strategy of “strategic patience” in dealing with China. She has suggested that it will take a year or more of cooling-off before the two sides can reach even a state of “agreeing to disagree,” and has rejected the idea of quick fixes or easy compromises to mend ties. This stance reflects her determination to prioritize alignment with the revived Trump administration while refusing to yield on core principles vis-à-vis China.

However, if at the 2026 G20 the United States hardens its protectionist stance and further intensifies its confrontation with China, Japan will be forced into an extremely delicate balancing act between the two.

In criticizing the South African-hosted G20, Trump has even spoken of “suspending funding for South Africa,” raising the risk that Japan’s strategy of building closer ties with the Global South could come into conflict with the policy line of its ally, the United States.

Upon returning from the G20, Takaichi emphasized that Japan would keep the door to dialogue with China open. Yet the conditions for actually walking through that door have become higher than ever, as both sides have now drawn firm red lines beyond which they cannot retreat.

What emerged in Johannesburg in 2025 was the solidification of a confrontation devoid of dialogue. Japan now faces an open-ended war of attrition in which it must constantly weigh economic interests against security principles.

While domestic tourism and export industries bear the pain, how can Japan protect its national interests amid a rapidly shifting international order? The true test of its diplomacy will not be on the bright stage of summits, but in the steady, grueling work of “patient diplomacy” that begins now.